Japan [Tag: Fucked]

[MahrinSkel]

Shit.  No, it doesn't.  It doesn't look like what I would have expected from a hydrogen explosion (no visible flame).

--Dave

EDIT: They've certainly lost the outer containment structure, and that should not have been possible with just a hydrogen explosion.  Fuck.  If they've lost all containment, there's jack shit they can do about it now.  Pour water on it and hope it doesn't melt clear through the bottom of the containment vessel, China Syndrome.

[FatuousTwat]

Welp, there goes my hope that more nuclear power plants would be built any time soon.

[Sheepherder]

The US Navy has people on site, and there is nobody better in the world at this kind of thing.

*Ahem*

[FatuousTwat]

I don't think maple trees are going to help them...


 

[Sheepherder]

Hey, I'm only half a member of the nation that designed the PWR currently in the process of melting down.

It doesn't look like what I would have expected from a hydrogen explosion (no visible flame).

Hydrogen emits mostly UV when it burns.  The big fireball the Hindenburg made was inefficient burning with a lot of reactive metals, cloth fibres, chemical treatments and humanity thrown into the mix.

[Jeff Kelly]

Please if you try to analyse what happened at the plant at least be exact. Fukujima I and II are BWR-type reactor designs from the late 60's early 70's

A BWR reactor is moderated by control rods that usually are inserted into the core from the bottom. This has to be done that way because the top of the containment is occupied by the steam the nuclear reaction produces and that directly drives the turbines. (There is only the primary circuit that directly drives power generation). The control rods can be inserted/emoved by several redundant systems, either by means of electric drives or by hydraulic power (this is usually done in emergency shutdowns). If all redundant shutdown measures fail the reactor will continue to be critical (if a reactor is critical it is in its default power generation mode). To go to shutdown at least one of the redundant failsafes has still to be operative.

In a PWR the control rods are inserted form the top and in case of an emergency shutdown they will be dropped into the containment, even gravity suffices for that. The only difference between the Fukujima type reactors and Chernobyl is that Chernobyl used Graphite as moderator and not light water. Water as a k-factor of <1. This means that the more water vaporizes the less efficient the nuclear reaction will become since less Neutrons are slowed down enough to be absorbed by the core. Since controlling the water flow leads to a more fine grained control of power output the power generation by BWR-type reactors is usually not only controlled by movement of the rods but also by regulating the flow of water to/from the reactor. (More steam means less output).

Even if the reactor is shut off the primary flow of water needs to continue because the core continues to produce residual heat long after the reaction has stopped. This is usually done by failsafes that should work even in the case of complete power loss, there are designs where circulation continues automatically by natural circulation or it is powered by battery-powered systems that are usually designed to keep up cooling the reactor for 72 hours. Usually though all safety and cooling system need either hydraulic or electric power to function even movement of the control rods. Even containment itself is designed to function as condenser and heat sink in case of an emergency.

If all safety masures fail because even your triple-failsafe systems are disabled by a major earthquake then you're in trouble. If you're the next Chernobyl or not is then only determined by if your containment is strong enough to contain the pressure and the melting fuel rods or not. If the reactor completely loses coolant then the main reaction will stop (in contrast to Chernobyl) but you won't be able to prevent the core from melting due to the residual heat emitted by the fuel rods either.

Submerging containment completely with coolant and venting the radioactive pressure into the environment is already the last resort measure if all else has failed. This is done if and only if all cooling failsafes failed and containment itself won't suffice as condenser and heat sink. If there is hydrogen present in the core the temperatures are already high enough that the coolant water gets seperated into hydrogen and oxygen, which is really really bad because that would mean that the temperature already exceeds 1400 degrees C.

[Jeff Kelly]

Two annotations. If Cesium is present it means that the control rods haven't been inserted into the core and that the nuclear reaction is still going because Cesium is a byproduct of the fission process. You can determine how much the moderator rods have been compromised by the amount of Cesium detected. This would then be the second time in 25 years that a 1 in 100 million type of event has occurred and the first time that something has happened 'that canÄt happen'

Also while I was busy being smug, the Japanese Government has declared the Fukujima plant to be in meltdown and that this is an 'unprecedented disaster' only to retract those statements a few minutes later.

My thoughts and prayers go out to all people in Japan even though this is thousands of miles away it has shocked me to the bone and I hope they're still able to prevent disaster.

[Trouble]

So you're saying that it's already clear all failsafes have been burnt through based on the facts we have? They vented radioactive steam yesterday, many hours before that explosion.

[Trouble]

The latest reports are that pressure and radiation levels are dropping.

http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/03/12/general-industrials-as-japan-earthquake_8352883.html

Edit: another concern I saw pointed out was, assuming the containment vessel is intact, it was a big fucking explosion is wouldn't it likely have blown up the coolant pipes? So they can still have a contained reactor and absolutely no way to cool it.

[Azazel]

Watched the live stream from NHK as it was happening yesterday evening (my time). The footage was much "better" than the highlight-reel shit the news channels keep repeating today, since it was live, unedited, and you could see where shit was happening, the choppers were following the water, and you could draw a visual context.

It was actually much more horrifying then the highlight reel, since you could see cars driving away, people getting out of their cars to run when some fuckwit up the front of the line wouldn't move, and then watching the people just get washed away into the tsunami. All live, in real time.

[Jeff Kelly]

Euronews has that as part of its coverage but I cannot bring myself to watch it, I'm not that cynical, yet. Unedited without VO comment just footage of the tsunami hitting major areas. Not even the most twisted horror movie was as gut-wrenching as watching some of that.

@Trouble: They requisitioned additional coolant from the US and the containment is now basically submerged in it. This coolant can't be light water. So all fail safes must have failed because if you look at countermeasures this usually is the final step. Before that the control rods should have been inserted, failsafe coolant circulation should have been working or the containment should function as condenser/heatsink, with excess pressure being released into the environment. So the question is if venting steam and providing additional coolant was enough to prevent disaster and containment is still intact.

The explosion could be 'just' the outer building being destroyed by ignited hydrogen or excess steam. The presense of Hydrogen and Cesium on site is at least circumstantial evidence that the core was at one time very hot and probably still critical after the quake.

Right now the evacuation zone is being extended to 60 kilometres and a british nuclear expert (John Large) on Al Jazeera deems it 'very unlikely' that containment is still intact and that all Japanese accounts and reports lead him to believe that primary and secondary containment are indeed compromised and 'massive radiation leaks' are probable.

I'm no expert but right now I'm hoping more for everything to be OK instead of being sure.

[Jeff Kelly]

Now the Head of the German equivalent of the EPA (which also functions as nuclear oversight and safety commission) Norbert Röttgen goes on record and says that 'according to his experts and the presence of certain elements like Cesium it is very likely if not sure that meltdown is happening'. They at least will act as if it is happening and have already extended an offer of help to the Japanese government.

God this is sad.

[Jeff Kelly]

Japanese government now plans to cool the site with sea water. Desperate measures

[Trouble]

There's no explanation or seemingly logic as to why things suddenly became ok shortly after the explosion. Every piece of clue-based commentary I've read says that even if shit was fine it'd take days for it to cool down. Why would we suddenly see a decrease in pressure AND radiation? There's nothing that would explain that.

[Jeff Kelly]

The affected block produces 350 Megawatts of Power at 35% efficiency. Which would roughly mean 1000 Megawatt of thermal output. If it isn't shut down it will keep on producing that kind of power, if it is it will still produce 10% of that for the following hours due to residual heat and residual nuclear reactions. A hefty 100 megawatt of thermal output that need to be cooled.

[Lantyssa]

Reports now are that it was a pumping system that failed when brought online and not the reactor.  Let's wait to see what happens instead of assuming the worst.

[Merusk]

I guess that might make some sense since the radiation dropped afterward, yes?  One pump exploded but another might be circulating fresh coolant in.

[Jeff Kelly]

I hope for the best but officials distributing jodine tablets and reports of the first victims of radiation being treated in Japanese hospitals doesn't sound good.

[Simond]

Or it's the sign of a government with working emergency relief protocols. 

[Jeff Kelly]

I literally pray that this is the case.

[Arthur_Parker]

At times like this it's worth remembering that there's not much advantage in telling us the truth, it's not going to substantially change anything.

[Mosesandstick]

One of the reasons why the response to Chernobyl was poor was the lack of reliable information.

[Arthur_Parker]

Human nature, people only get 100% honest at work when things are really fucked up.

Edit, besides at Chernobyl, wasn't the guy in charge lying that the reactor shell was intact even after the explosion?  Pretty hard to convincingly do that when a massive explosion has been caught on camera.

[Mosesandstick]

Can't remember all the details, but the denial was heavy on most levels. One of the obvious examples being the firefighters who weren't informed of the risks of what they were doing.

[Jeff Kelly]

They didn't even acknowledge it after US spy satellites spotted the destroyed reactor after looking for something because radiation alarms all over europe went crazy.

The even waited two days before they informed the people of Pripyat and the USSR administration

[Minvaren]

Quake shifted earth on its axis by 4 inches

The powerful earthquake that unleashed a devastating tsunami Friday appears to have moved the main island of Japan by 8 feet (2.4 meters) and shifted the Earth on its axis.

 

Even with all of the photos and press releases, it's hard to wrap one's head around the sheer scope of something like this.  My thoughts go out to everyone affected by this.

[Arthur_Parker]

Can't remember all the details, but the denial was heavy on most levels. One of the obvious examples being the firefighters who weren't informed of the risks of what they were doing.

I saw a documentary years ago, think I'll hunt out some information on it again as it was both horrifying and fascinating.

Stages of crisis management

It is apparent that the various "actors" involved in civilian nuclear accidents act in a remarkably consistent fashion when confronted with a crisis. Those responsible attempt, as far as possible, to conceal the extent of the accident and to promulgate an optimistic view of the situation. Such a reaction, therefore, was not unique to the Soviet government after Chernobyl. This author has stated elsewhere that, as a test of glasnost in the USSR, Chernobyl was a failure. However, the reaction of the Soviet authorities - silence until confronted with incontrovertible proof that radiation had spread beyond the borders of the USSR - was not dissimilar to that of Metropolitan Edison in the case of TMI, or of the UKAEA after the fire at Windscale/Sellafield (President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island 1979). This does not mean that any of these organizations were overtly callous or reckless. The individuals involved most probably believed that the consequences of the respective accidents could be contained in secret, free from the attentions of troublesome and irresponsible media. In all three cases cited, the evident secrecy surrounding the accidents served to decrease public trust of the industry and to inflame the media and other interest groups.

The media reacted to the lack of information in two different ways. First, reporters began to speculate what might have happened. Such speculations included two reactor explosions at Chernobyl, mass graves for thousands of victims, a nuclear meltdown, and similar stories. Apart from the differing scale of events, this development paralleled what had happened after TMI seven years earlier. There, an unrelated fire that broke out the day after the accident was quickly reported as a reactor fuel fire. Metropolitan Edison was also reported to be burning radioactive material at night, out of the public eye. Both of these reports were false, but they were partly a result of failure to provide timely and accurate information.

Why did the authorities react in such a fashion? There are several possible reasons. The one that is most often cited (and it was referred to with regularity after Chernobyl) is that they wished to avoid panic among the population. Ivan Yemelyanov, one of the designers of the Chernobyl plant and a deputy director of the USSR Institute of Energy Technology, informed the Italian Communist Party newspaper, Unita, that selective information had been released about the accident in order to forestall panic (Marples 1986: 170). (Literature on human responses to disaster would suggest that generally confusion, shock, and trauma are more likely than outright panic, and the majority of the population in Pripyat appears to have conformed to this norm.) The most charitable explanation for holding May Day parades in Kiev and Minsk, only five days after the accident, is that the Ukrainian and Belarusian governments were anxious to portray life as "normal."

I was just making the point that historically all kinds of factors limit accurate information being released while the situation is ongoing.

[Kalle]

Can't remember all the details, but the denial was heavy on most levels. One of the obvious examples being the firefighters who weren't informed of the risks of what they were doing.

Well, horrible as it was they needed people to put out fires and seal the site. They might have been less willing or able to do so in a timely fashion if they knew that they were being exposed to lethal levels of radiation. Gorbachev's science advisor visited the site wearing 30 kgs of lead protective gear, standing next to workers with facemasks as their only protection. So the people in charge knew. They chose not to tell.

[Jeff Kelly]

Yeah I'm watching it right now. In an impressive display of bad taste German public TV is currently showing a documentation on Chernobyl for the 25th anniversary this year.

[Jeff Kelly]

To be fair. All of those brave people probably prevented a follow up explosion in the megaton range that would have destroyed Kiew and probably made Europe a nuclear wasteland.

[Simond]

Human nature, people only get 100% honest at work when things are really fucked up.

Edit, besides at Chernobyl, wasn't the guy in charge lying that the reactor shell was intact even after the explosion?  Pretty hard to convincingly do that when a massive explosion has been caught on camera.

Chernobyl essentially didn't have a containment chamber. It had a building around the core, but that was basically four walls+roof, not anything that could withstand any real damage (which was quite evident). That was one of the main problems, along with the pants-on-head retarded reactor design and the inexperienced crew deliberately seeing how far they could push things before something went wrong.

[Ghambit]

Doesnt Nuclear science have a site like "The Oil Drum" with knowledgeable folks following this situation minute by minute?

[Arthur_Parker]

along with the pants-on-head retarded reactor design and the inexperienced crew deliberately seeing how far they could push things before something went wrong.

I'm not sure that part of your post is entirely accurate, I thought that was just part of the first cover story.

[Sheepherder]

I guess that might make some sense since the radiation dropped afterward, yes?  One pump exploded but another might be circulating fresh coolant in.

Wire sheathing, belts, and petroleum products do not burn cleanly.

[Arthur_Parker]

Different documentary from the one I saw before but maybe more recent, based on the response to the accident more than the lead up to it.

The True Battle of Chernobyl

edit another one.

Inside Chernobyl's Sarcophagus

The Russians are absolutely insane, the robots keep breaking, even the western ones because the radioactivity is so high it's frying them, I know lets ask for volunteers to go out there.  Comrade, you have 60 seconds to complete your mission....